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Abstract
We develop a dynamic model to analyze the sources and the evolution
of social participation and social capital in a growing economy charac-
terized by exogenous technical progress. Starting from the assumption
that the well-being of agents basically depends on material and relational
goods, we show that the best-case scenarios hold when technology and so-
cial capital both support just one of the two productions at the expenses of
the other. However, trajectories are possible where technology and social
interaction balance one another in fostering the growth of both the social
and the private sector of the economy. Along such tracks, technology may
play a crucial role in supporting a “socially sustainable” economic growth.
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Solaria was a planet inhabited by Spacer descendants1. The 50th and last Spacer
world settled, it had perhaps the most eccentric culture of all of them. Origi-
nally, there were about 20,000 people living alone in vast estates. Solarians’ lives
were marked by technology: citizens never had to meet, save for sexual contact
for reproductive purposes. All other contact was accomplished by sophisticated
holographic viewing systems, with most Solarians exhibiting a strong phobia
towards actual contact, or even being in the same room as another human. All
work was done by robots: there were indeed thousands of robots for every So-
larian. As centuries went by, Solaria became even more rigidly and obsessively
isolationist. The planet cut oﬀ all contact with the rest of the Galaxy (although
continuing to monitor hyperspatial communications). Its inhabitants geneti-
cally altered themselves to be hermaphroditic. At the ﬁnal stage of Solarian
civilization, the human inhabitants vanished, giving the impression that they
had died out, although they had in fact withdrawn underground; their estates
continued to be worked by millions of robots.
Solaria is a ﬁctional planet in Isaac Asimov’s Foundation and Robot series.
The author draws on this metaphor to warn against the risks of dehumaniza-
tion that may be brought about by an excessive and indiscriminate technical
progress. In the 1950s, Asimov’s novel well embodied the common fear accord-
ing to which technology would have progressively destroyed social interaction.
Today, at the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century, our lives are marked by
technology almost as those of Solarians. The widespread diﬀusion of the broad-
band, the internet revolution, and the true explosion of online networks like
Facebook, Flickr and Twitter is worrying social scientists, who fear the risk of
growing relational poverty. However, the evidence on such fears is not convinc-
ing. According to some authors, communication technologies lower the prob-
ability of having face-to-face visits with family, neighbors, or friends in one’s
home (Boase et al. 2006, Gershuny 2003, McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 2006,
Nie et al., 2002). Wellman et al. (2006) note that internet usage may even inter-
fere with communication in the home, creating a “post-familial family” where
family members spend time interacting with computers, rather than with each
other. Burke et al. (2009) ﬁnd that more intensive Facebook use is associated
with lower actual contact and higher loneliness. On the other side, Frenzen
(2003) ﬁnds that internet use is not associated with a reduction in social inter-
action. Rather, the time devoted to the web is taken away from that spent on
watching television. Drawing on survey data from a Canadian suburb, Hamp-
ton and Wellman (2003) show that high-speed access to the Internet enhances
neighboring and increases contact with weaker ties. Ellison et al. (2007) ﬁnd
1The planet Solaria ﬁrst appeared in “The naked sun”, the second novel in Isaac Asimov’s
Robot series. The novel was ﬁrst published in 1957 after being serialized in Astounding Science
Fiction between October and December 1956. Solaria is also the background of the third novel
of the Robot Series, “The robots of dawn”, ﬁrst published in 1983. Then, the planet appeared
again in the ﬁfth novel of the hyper-celebrated Foundation Series, “Foundation and Earth”,
ﬁrst published in 1986.
1a positive and strong relationship between Facebook usage and bridging social
capital in a sample of undergraduate students. More recent studies show that
participation in online communities signiﬁcantly enhances social capital in the
form of networks and trust (Putnam and Kolko, 2009, Valenzuela et al., 2009,
Vergeer and Pelzer, 2009a, 2009b). GSS data are used also by Robinson and
Martin (2010), who ﬁnd that internet use is not consistently correlated with
lower levels of socializing or other social activities. This literature suﬀers from
three main shortcomings: 1) results are conﬂicting; 2) the boom in online net-
works is so recent that we still lack suitable data to analyze the relationship
between social participation and technology in the long run; the literature, still
conﬁned to the ﬁelds of applied psychology and computer-mediated commu-
nication, is mostly based on very limited case studies, so that its results can
be hardly generalized; 3) in economics, we lack theoretical analyses addressing
the causal mechanism. The relationship between growth, technology and social
interaction has in fact been addressed mainly with regard to the ability of so-
cial norms and networks to foster economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997,
Bartolini and Bonatti, 2002, Annen, 2003, Cozzi and Galli, 2009, Dearmon and
Grier, 2009), or technology adoption both in developed high income areas (Burt,
1987, Akcomakak and ter Weel, 2009, Braguinsky and Rose, 2009), and in rural
poor contexts (Conley and Udry, 2001, Barr, 2002, Isham, 2002). The reverse
eﬀects exerted by growth and technology on social participation are so far a
rather neglected topic. Thus, it is still unpredictable whether the “Solaria syn-
drome” is an actual risk for developed countries. This paper aims to improve
our understanding through a theoretical analysis addressing the sources and the
evolution of social participation and social capital in a growing economy charac-
terized by exogenous technical progress. We start from the assumption that the
well-being of agents depends on the consumption of two goods: a private good
and a socially provided one. Individuals allocate their time between “private”
activities, i.e. the production and consumption of material goods, and social
participation, i.e. the production and consumption of relational goods. Fol-
lowing Coleman (1988, 1990), we assume that social participation incidentally
generates durable ties as a by-product. In the long run, such ties accumulate in
a stock which constitutes the “social capital” of the economy. To implement one
of the most popular claims emerging from the empirical literature, we assume
that such stock, besides facilitating social participation, also plays a role in the
production of material goods. In principle, private and relational goods serve
diﬀerent needs. However, we introduce the possibility that, thanks to the help of
technology, private goods can substitute for relational ones in the satisfaction of
social needs. If the surrounding environment is socially poor, people may prefer
to chat with unknown and distant people through the web instead of talking
with neighbours. Even when material consumption is patently unable to satisfy
social needs, it can at least compensate for the deprivation of human relations:
for example, agents may comfort themselves for the lack of a bowling team by
playing a virtual match against a computer. In such a theoretical framework,
we introduce an exogenous technical progress aﬀecting the productivity of both
the private and the relational spheres of the economy. This set of assumptions
2allows us to explain the growing social isolation often accompanying economic
development as a result of the process of substitution between the two kinds of
goods. Such process may cause the erosion of the entire stock of social capital,
thereby leading the economy to fall down in a “social poverty” trap (Antoci et
al. 2007, 2008). Our primary research questions are: is it possible to avoid such
collapse? Are there paths of sustainable development where technical progress
and growth do not take place at the expenses of social participation? Or are we
destined to live ever more comfortable, but isolated and unhappy, lives? Our
work contributes to the literature by assessing whether the Solaria syndrome
is an actual risk, in the belief that a better understanding of the mechanisms
supporting the syndrome would be a ﬁrst step along the path to ﬁnd a cure.
Namely, we identify a conﬁguration of parameters under which the economy is
more likely to reconcile growth and technology with social participation. Such a
setting of the model oﬀers guidelines for policy makers interested in improving
the well-being of citizens through the preservation of the relational sphere of
their lives. Moreover, we contribute to the cross-disciplinary debate by imple-
menting into an analytical framework a complex set of assumptions modelled
around the ﬁndings of the previous empirical literature in economics, sociology,
and political science. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related
literature and our main assumptions will be discussed in the review in Section
2 and within the set up of the model described in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5
analyze the dynamics of the model. Section 6 addresses the eﬀect of technical
progress. The paper is closed by some concluding remarks.
2 Related literature
Human relations matter for happiness and well-being. This statement sounds so
obvious that most people would be surprised to know that the analysis of social
interactions is quite a novelty in the contemporary economic debate. In tradi-
tional economics, the agents’ utility basically depends on material consumption
and leisure time. In this framework, the economic action can be represented as
a time allocation choice between working and leisure activities. Working allows
people to gain the income necessary to buy those material goods that will be
consumed in the leisure time. Such a narrow view of economics began to be
questioned in the 1970s. According to Manski (2000), “Since then a new phase
has been underway, in which the discipline seeks to broaden its scope while
maintaining the rigor that has become emblematic of economic analysis” (115).
As a result, the idea that the economic behavior of agents is deeply rooted in the
social and moral spheres of their lives is now commonly accepted in the debate.
Still, it is worth noting that this view is notably older than either the recent be-
havioral economics literature or the modern economic sociology. Explanations
of the embeddedness of the economic action can in fact be easily retrieved in
the work of the classical economists. While it is generally acknowledged that,
in the work of Marx and Ricardo, economic actors are deeply socialized, a num-
ber of authors ﬁnd traces of the typical codewords pervading the social capital
3literature (e.g. trust, norms, values, altruism, sympathy, and so on) in the work
of Smith as well (see for example Becker, 1981, Bruni, 2000, Fontaine, 2000).
In the Lectures on Jurisprudence, Smith states: “A dealer is afraid of losing his
character, and is scrupulous in performing every engagement. When a person
makes perhaps 20 contracts in a day, he cannot gain so much by endeavouring
to impose on his neighbours, as the very appearance of a cheat would make
him lose. Where people seldom deal with one another, we ﬁnd that they are
somewhat disposed to cheat, because they can gain more by a smart trick than
they can lose by the injury which it does their character.” (1763/1978, 539).
Smith’s argument basically refers to trading relationships, but it can be easily
generalized to every kind of interaction. A social environment rich of partic-
ipation opportunities, which allow people to meet frequently, creates a fertile
ground for nurturing trust and shared values. The higher likelihood of repeated
interactions increases the opportunity cost of free-riding in prisoner’s dilemma
kind of situations, thereby making the agents behaviour more foreseeable and
causing an overall reduction of uncertainty. In other words, social interactions
are a vehicle for the diﬀusion of information and trust which inevitably aﬀect the
economic activity, so that the two spheres of individual action continuously fade
one another. Such claims more or less explicitly ground most of the contempo-
rary social capital research in economics. Smith’s view is similar to the modern
theories of social capital developed in sociology by Granovetter (1973), who ar-
gues that social ties work as bridges through which information and trust spread
across diverse communities and socioeconomic backgrounds. On the other side,
the value of reputation and social approval is considered by Smith one of the
main engines of human action. The importance of social approval is further
stressed by Bentham (1789), who makes a step forward by mentioning 15 ba-
sic wants grounding the economic action. Among them, the author lists the
pleasures of being on good terms with others, the pleasures of a good name, the
pleasures resulting from the view of any pleasure supposed to be possessed by the
beings who may be the objects of benevolence, and the pleasures resulting from
the view of any pain supposed to be suﬀered by the beings who may become the
objects of malevolence. The agents described by classical economists are thus
deeply rooted in the social context, and their economic activities strictly depend
on the complex of norms and relationships surrounding them. In our framework,
the embeddedness of economic action takes the form of a continuous osmosis
between the private and the relational spheres of the agents’ lives. As it will be
better outlined in the next section (devoted to the set up of the model), such
osmosis is modelled through the assumption that the well-being of the represen-
tative agent depends on the consumption of two types of good: material goods,
which in principle are produced in the private sphere of individuals, and socially
provided goods, concerning the relational life of agents. Relational goods are a
distinctive type of good that can only be enjoyed if shared with others. They
are diﬀerent from private goods, which are enjoyed alone, and standard public
goods, which can be enjoyed by any number (Uhlaner, 1989). A peculiarity of
relational goods is that it is virtually impossible to separate their production
from consumption, since they coincide (Gui and Sugden, 2005). For example,
4a football match with friends is enjoyed (consumed) in the very moment of its
production (i.e. the 90’ spent on the sport ﬁeld). The production processes of
the two types of good are not separated. Rather, they continuously fade one
another. The production and consumption of relational goods create durable
ties which accumulate in a stock deﬁned as social capital. We implement the
claims from the empirical literature by assuming that this stock may play a
crucial role in the production of material goods. From this point of view, we
embrace the approaches proposed by the sociological and political science liter-
ature, where social capital is treated as a collective resource or, in other terms,
as a public good (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986, Coleman,1988, 1990, Putnam, et al.
1993). In our framework, the osmosis between the aspects of life is even more
evident when it brings about “negative” eﬀects, i.e. when the expansion of one
of the spheres causes a shrinking of the other. For example, the model shows
the conditions under which an increase in the importance of private production
and consumption may lead to social isolation, moreover pointing out which role
technology may play in such a substitution process.
3 Set up of the model
We consider a population of size 1 constituted by a continuum of identical
agents. We assume that, in each instant of time t, the well-being of the repre-
sentative agent depends on the consumption C(t) of a private good and on the
consumption B(t) of a socially provided good. We assume that B(t) is produced
by means of the joint action of the time devoted by the representative agent to
social activities, s(t), of the economy-wide average social participation s(t) and
of the stock of social capital Ks(t):
B(t) = F [s(t),s(t),Ks(t)] (1)
The average social participation s(t) and the current stock of social capital
Ks(t) are crucial arguments, since relational goods can only be enjoyed if shared
with others (Uhlaner, 1989). If the social environment is rich of participation
opportunities, because many people participate (s(t) is high) and there are well-
established networks of relations (Ks(t) is high), then the individual production
of relational goods is easier (Antoci et al., 2005, 2007, 2008). Still, the produc-
tion of relational goods requires a certain eﬀort by individuals as well, s(t). The
time the representative agent does not spend on social participation, 1 − s(t),
is used as an input in the production of the output Y (t) of the private sector.
Starting from the assumption that social capital can be treated as a factor of
production or, at least, as a factor aﬀecting transaction costs (see for example
Paldam and Svendsen, 2000), we model one of the most debated claims from
the empirical literature by assuming that social capital also may play a role in
the production process of the private good.
In addition, for simplicity, we assume that C(t) = Y (t), that is Y (t) cannot
be accumulated, and that the production process of Y (t) requires only the inputs
1 − s(t) and Ks(t):
5C(t) = Y (t) = G[1 − s(t),Ks(t)] (2)
The functions F and G in (1) and (2) are assumed to be strictly increasing
in each argument. Note that 1−s(t) can be interpreted as the time spent both
to produce and to consume C(t).
For simplicity, we consider the following Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcations for (1),
(2):




Where γ > α ≥ 0 and 1 > β > 0; the parameter α represents the elasticity
of Y with respect to Ks and the parameters β, 1 − β and γ are the elasticities

















We assume that γ > α because even if we acknowledge that social capital
may play a role in the production of material goods (α ≥ 0), it is likely for
it to be more relevant in the production and consumption of relational goods.
A positive average social participation s(t) > 0 is always required for the pro-
duction/consumption of B(t), that is B(t) = 0 if s(t) = 0 whatever the value
of Ks(t) is. If no one participates, single agents have no possibility to enjoy
relational goods, even in presence of a positive stock of social capital. On the
other hand, we account for the possibility that social capital may be an essential
input in the production of material goods: in the context α > 0, if Ks = 0, then
Y (t) = 0. As outlined above, the assumption that phenomena such as trust,
moral norms, and networks are indispensable assets for material production is
commonly acknowledged in the ﬁeld of behavioral economics. It is worth noting
that this view dates back to the dawn of economic science. As mentioned in the
review in Section 2, Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments presages some
of the claims recently proposed by behavioral studies. In particular, Smith be-
lieved that there were certain virtues, such as trust and a concern for fairness,
that were vital for the functioning of a market economy. He wrote about trust
and reciprocity as critical foundations of the early beginnings of the market,
allowing reciprocal gift exchange to emerge, and leading to trade (Ashraf et al.
2005). In our analysis, we embrace this insight and argue that the functioning of
the economy itself may rely on those institutions (whether formal or informal)
that the literature groups together under the common “label” of social capital
(e.g. norms of trust and reciprocity, moral sanctions, newtorks of relationships,
and organizations). If this is the case, then the economy’s possibility of “re-
producing” itself, thereby experiencing sustainable growth, depends also on its
ability to foster or at least to preserve, positive endowments of social capital.
6The parameter β represents the agents’ ability to contribute to the pro-
duction/consumption of relational goods through their own eﬀort into social
participation, given the participation of the others and the stock of social capi-
tal.
The time evolution of social capital is assumed to depend on the average
social participation s and on the stock of social capital:
˙ Ks = I(s,Ks) − ηKs = sδKs − ηKs (5)
where ˙ Ks(t) indicates the time derivative of Ks(t), and 1 > δ,η > 0. The
exponent of Ks in the function I(s,Ks) is assumed to be equal to 1 since we
aim at analyzing a context in which the unbounded growth of Ks is (at least
a priori) possible; however, posing the exponent strictly higher than 1 may give
rise to “explosive” growth paths of Ks along which Ks goes to inﬁnity in ﬁnite
time. The parameter η indicates the depreciation rate of Ks; its value is positive
because social ties need care to be preserved over time.
The parameter δ measures the elasticity of the “investment function” I in





In our framework, social participation takes the form of the consumption of
relational goods. Following Coleman (1988), we assume that the networks of
durable ties forming the stock of social capital are created and strengthened as
an incidental by-product of social participation, to an extent determined by the
elasticity δ2. The model also acknowledges the path-dependent nature of social
capital. According to prominent authors emphasizing the “cultural” nature
of social capital (see for example Fukuyama, 1995, and the conclusions of the
“Italian work” by Putnam et al., 1993), norms and networks are deeply rooted
in the past history of a territory. In this paper, the time evolution of social
capital depends also on the current level of its stock. Note that arguments s
and Ks are essential for the creation of social capital. If just one of these is equal
to zero, then the time evolution of social capital will be negative (i.e. there will
be an erosion of the stock), due to the depreciation phenomenon.
Finally, we assume that the instantaneous utility of the representative agent
is represented by the following CES function:
U(C,B) = [λC−θ + (1 − λ)B−θ]− 1
θ (6)
where θ ∈ (−1,+∞), θ  = 0, and λ ∈ (0,1). Here we model the assump-
tion that the agents’ well-being depends on private and relational goods. As
we state in the introduction, these goods serve diﬀerent needs. However, we
introduce the possibility that private goods substitute for relational ones in the
satisfaction of social needs, or, at least, for compensating the deprivation of
2This assumption was also used in the economic growth models analyzed by Antoci et al.
(2005, 2007, 2008).
7human interactions. For example, a material, highly technology intensive, good
like a playstation can (partially) console for the unavailability of 21 friends to
play football on a sport ﬁeld. The extent to which such a substitution process
can take place is given by ρ = 1
1+θ, measuring the (constant) elasticity of sub-
stitution between C and B. We will refer to the case θ > 0 by saying that
there is “low” substitutability between B and C . In this situation, material
and relational goods are “complements”. If θ < 0, there is high substitutability
between material and relational goods. We will refer to this case by saying that
B and C are “substitutes”3.







under the constraint (5); the parameter r measures the subjective discount
rate. Being economic agents a continuum, the choice of s(t) by each agent has
no eﬀect on the aggregate value s(t); consequently, in each instant of time t, the
representative agent takes s(t) and Ks(t) as exogenously given. This implies
that, for every instant of time t, the solution s(t) of problem (7) coincides with










 −θ − 1
θ
(8)
subject to the constraint s ∈ [0,1].
4 The evolution of social participation
Since all agents make the same choice of s(t), the aggregate social participation
s(t) coincides (ex post) with the social participation s(t) chosen by the repre-
sentative agent. Writing the ﬁrst order conditions for problem (8) (given s(t))






















where 1 > s∗ > 0 always holds.
3It is well known (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1999, pp. 42-46) that, for θ > 0
(respectively, θ < 0), the elasticity of substitution between C and B is lower (higher) than
that of the Cobb-Douglas utility function. For θ → −1, the goods C and B tend to be perfect
substitutes, that is ρ → +∞; if this condition holds, then the utility of a combination of C
and B is an increasing function of the sum of the two amounts. For θ → +∞, ρ → 0: in this
case, the goods C and B tend to be perfect complements; in this extreme case, material and
relational goods are like the right and the left piece of a pair of shoes and the representative
agent has a Leontief-like utility function.
8Note that s∗ is increasing in β, i.e. social participation increases with the ability
of agents to inﬂuence their relational sphere through their own eﬀort (see (??)).
The following proposition shows how the equilibrium social participation s∗
varies according to an increase in the stock Ks of social capital.
Proposition 1 The Nash equilibrium value s∗ of social participation is increas-
ing in Ks if θ < 0 and decreasing if θ > 0.
The proof of this proposition is straightforward.
Remember that, by assumption, γ > α holds; this implies that, when Ks
increases, the time spent in social participation becomes relatively more produc-
tive with respect to that spent in the production of the private good. In such a
context, the above proposition says that there is a positive correlation between
s∗ and Ks if θ < 0 (i.e. if C and B are substitutes); in such a case, after an
increase in social capital, agents devote more time to social participation in that
they are willing to replace private goods with relational ones (vice-versa when
Ks decreases). If θ > 0, the opposite holds; in this case, after an increase in
social capital, agents reduce their social participation in order to obtain a bal-
anced growth of their material and relational consumptions. Think for example
to a narrow-minded social environment where going out with friends requires
expensive clothes and a prestigious car. Here, a strengthening of the existing
networks will lead agents to work more, at the expenses of social participation,
in order to earn the income necessary for acquiring material goods.
The parameter θ, deﬁning the degree of substitutability between material
and relational goods, is shaped mainly by moral and cultural factors. For ex-
ample, a culture exalting the prominence of reciprocity and solidarity in social
life, and acknowledging the importance of non market relations in respect to
material consumption, may noticeably reduce the elasticity of substitution be-
tween C and B. If people are not willing to “commodify” all their time, then
the replacement of relational goods with material ones may be perceived as too
painful. In a more materialistic society, where material possessions are believed
to ﬁll all human needs and are perceived as a distinctive feature of the quality
of life, the degree of substitutability is likely to be higher.
5 Dynamics
In equation (5), s(t) must be replaced by the solution s∗ to the problem (8).
The resulting dynamics are not optimal. However, each trajectory under such
dynamics represents a Nash equilibrium path of the economy in that, along it,
no agent has an incentive to modify his choices if the others do not revise theirs
as well.
The (Nash) equilibrium dynamics can be written as follows:





















θ+1 > 0. The basic properties of dynamics under equa-
tion (10) are illustrated by the following propositions.
Proposition 2 Along the trajectories of equation (10), the values of the utility
function U and of Ks are positively correlated. This implies that if there exist













s; that is, K
1
s is a poverty trap, when attracting.
Proposition 3 The stationary states of dynamics (10) are:
K
0

















(1) If θ < 0, then the stationary state K
0
s is locally attractive and K
1
s is
repulsive (see Figure 1.a). The economy follows a growth trajectory along which




(2) If θ > 0, then the stationary state K
0
s is repulsive and K
1
s is globally
attractive (see Figure 1.b). The economy cannot follow a trajectory along which
Ks grows without bound.
Figure 1: (a) Dynamics in the context θ < 0 (b) Dynamics in the context
θ > 0.
The proof of these propositions are straightforward. According to the last
proposition, the stock of social capital can follow a path of unbounded growth
only if θ < 0, that is, in the context where the equilibrium social participation
s∗ is positively correlated to Ks; this condition holds (see Proposition 1) if B
and C are substitutes. Being s∗positively correlated to Ks in the case θ < 0, the
variations in the stock of Ks tend to be self-enforcing: an increase (respectively,
a decrease) in Ks leads to an increase (decrease) in s∗ which in turn gives rise
to a further increase (decrease) in Ks. This mechanism explains the coexistence
10between growth paths approaching the poverty trap K
0
s = 0 and growth paths
along which Ks grows without bound4. The opposite holds in the context θ > 0,
where the negative correlation between s∗ and Ks does not lead the economy
neither to approach K
0
s = 0 nor to follow a path of perpetual growth of Ks.
6 Exogenous technological progress
In the framework developed in the previous section, the degree of substitutabil-
ity between private and relational goods plays a key role in the evolution of social
participation. As we already hinted in the introduction, it is rather intuitive
that technology can in turn crucially inﬂuence the substitution process. In this
section, we introduce exogenous technical progress in our model. The primary
research questions to which we aim to provide an answer here are: which is the
role of technology in determining the trajectories of the economy in respect to
social participation and social capital? Is the Solaria syndrome an actual risk?
If this is the case, a better understanding of the mechanisms supporting the
syndrome would be a ﬁrst step along the path to ﬁnd a cure.
Here we assume that technical progress raises the productivity both in the pri-
vate and in the relational sector. The assumption is based on the observation
that technology can help the production of relational goods in a variety of ways.
Communication technologies are of great support in preserving social ties from
cooling (this is the case of online networks like Facebook and Flickr and, more
in general, of the infrastructures allowing their diﬀusion, like computers and the
broadband), in reconnecting with old friends (think for example of the ability of
Facebook to refresh relationships with school and college mates), and in arrang-
ing meetings with kin and friends we are used to see in our everyday life (besides
the online networks cited above, consider the unquestionable role of cell-phones,
emails, and newer tools like Skype and Messenger). The production functions
of the two goods can now be expressed as:




where T represents technological progress, growing at the exogenous rate   > 0:
 
T =  T (12)
and π > 0 and ψ > 0 are the elasticities of Y and B, in respect to T.
According to (12), T(t) = T(0)e t holds.
4Antoci and Bartolini (1997, 1999, 2005) analyze this kind of self-enforcing mechanism
in a context where private goods and open-access natural resources are substitutes. In such
a context, they show that the depletion of natural resources is an engine of “undesirable”
economic growth.
11In this context, the time allocation choice and the accumulation dynamics of




































































+  (π − ψ)
 
(16)
Since (16) is an autonomous diﬀerential equation, we can carry out a complete
classiﬁcation of the dynamic regimes under (16) (see the Appendix).
Proposition 4 The dynamic regimes generated by the equation (16) can be
classiﬁed as follows:
1. If 1 >
η(α−γ)− (π−ψ)
α−γ > 0 and θ
θ+1 [(1 − η)(α − γ) +  (π − ψ)] > 0,
then there exists an interior stationary state H∗, which is repulsive. Starting
from an initial value H(0) < H∗, then H → 0; starting from H(0) > H∗, then
H → +∞.
2. If 1 >
η(α−γ)− (π−ψ)
α−γ > 0 and θ
θ+1 [(1 − η)(α − γ) +  (π − ψ)] < 0, then
there exists an interior stationary state H∗, which is globally attractive.
3. If
η(α−γ)− (π−ψ)
α−γ < 0 ∨
η(α−γ)− (π−ψ)
α−γ > 1 and θ
θ+1 [(1 − η)(α − γ) +  (π − ψ)] >
0, then an interior stationary state H∗ does not exist and H → +∞ for every
initial value H(0) > 0.
4. If
η(α−γ)− (π−ψ)
α−γ < 0 ∨
η(α−γ)− (π−ψ)
α−γ > 1 and θ
θ+1 [(1 − η)(α − γ) +  (π − ψ)] <
0, then an interior stationary state H∗ does not exist and H → 0 for every initial
value H(0) > 0.
According to the above proposition, it is easy to check that the following
three diﬀerent scenarios can occur:






s → 0 (cases 1 and 4 of the above proposi-
tion). In this case, Ks → 0, for t → +∞.






s → +∞ (cases 1 and 3). In this case,
Ks → +∞, for t → +∞.






s → H∗ (case 2). In this case, Ks behaves
diﬀerently according to the sign of π−ψ. In particular, if π−ψ < 0, then
Ks → 0 holds; if π − ψ > 0, then Ks → +∞ holds.
When T equally contributes to the production of material and relational
goods (i.e. π = ψ), the time allocation choices are not aﬀected by technical
progress. In this extreme case, we have the same results obtained in the frame-
work without exogenous technical progress.
The above proposition shows that either Ks → 0 or Ks → +∞ may hold,
that is, Ks cannot approach a strictly positive value. The introduction of tech-
nical progress makes social participation and social capital follow signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent dynamics. more speciﬁcally, the stock of social capital cannot converge
to a positive value. This result is instead possible in the case without technical
progress if θ > 0 , i.e. if the two goods B and C are complements. The eﬀect of
T in fact prevails on the “stabilizing mechanism” according to which, if there is
no substitutability between B and C, a reduction in the stock of social capital
is accompanied by a rise in social participation, due to the conﬁguration of the
individual preferences. In other words, the model shows that technical progress
rules out the intermediate case where the dynamic of social capital can converge
to a ﬁnite value. Figure 2 shows a qualitative representation of the four cases
outlined in the above proposition. The black dots are the ﬁxed points in the
diﬀerent regimes. In Case 1, H∗
1 is a repulsive ﬁxed point and 0 and inﬁnity
are attractors; in Case 2, H∗
2 is the unique attractor of the system; in Case 3,
inﬁnity is the unique attractor of the system; in Case 4, 0 is the unique attractor
of the system. Diﬀerently from the case without technical progress, where the
stock of social capital can converge to a positive value, Ks can now tend either
to 0 or to +∞ .
Figure 2: A qualitative representation of the four cases outlined in proposition
4.
It is easy to check that the previous proposition has the following corollary,
which provides the necessary and suﬃcient conditions allowing for the existence
of trajectories along which Ks → +∞:
13Proposition 5 Under dynamics (16), there exist trajectories along which Ks →
+∞ if and only if5:
a) π − ψ > 0 holds and either condition (a.1) or condition (a.2) holds,
where:
a.1) θ < 0,   <
(1−η)(γ−α)
π−ψ
a.2) θ > 0,   >
(1−η)(γ−α)
π−ψ
b) π − ψ < 0 and θ < 0 hold.
In the context (a.1), the dynamics are bi-stable, that is, Ks → +∞ or Ks →
0 can be observed according to the initial values of Ks and T. In the context
(a.2), Ks → +∞ always holds whatever the (strictly positive) initial values of
Ks and T are. Finally, in the context (b), bi-stable dynamics occur if:




If condition (17) is not satisﬁed, then Ks → +∞ always holds.
When technology has higher returns in the private sector (condition a), we
have two possibilities:
(a1) if B and C are substitutes, a high growth rate of technology leads
agents to replace relational with material goods. In order to preserve the stock
of social capital, technical progress should not be “too fast”.
(a2) if B and C are complements, in order to preserve the stock of social
capital, technology should grow at a high rate.
In other words, if technical progress grows at a high rate and if π − ψ > 0
(i.e. an increase in T and Ks is accompanied by a “balanced” growth of the
productivity of time spent in private and social activities), then the complemen-
tarity between the two kinds of good rules out the risk of contracting the Solaria
Syndrome (i.e. of falling in the social poverty trap Ks = 0). By contrast, the
Syndrome remains an actual risk if B and C are substitutes6.
Condition (b), holding when technology has lower returns in the private sec-
tor, is analogous to that allowing for an unbounded growth of Ks in the model
without technical progress: θ < 0. The scenarios described by this condition are
characterized by the fact that both technical progress and the accumulation of
social capital cause a higher productivity increase in the social sector. Increases
in T and Ks cause an unbalanced growth of the productivity of time spent in
social activities. If B and C are complements (θ > 0), then trajectories of un-
bounded growth of Ks are not possible. If B and C are substitutes (θ < 0),
then, after an increase in T and Ks, agents will devote more time to social par-
ticipation because, thanks to the substitutability they prefer to replace private
goods with relational ones. In this case, substitutability works as a condition
for the unbounded growth of social capital. In the context of (b), condition (17)
means that, if technical progress grows at a high enough rate, then the risk of
falling in the social poverty trap Ks = 0 is precluded.
5For simplicity, we limit our analysis to “robust” cases, where π − ψ  = 0.
6This risk has been previously outlined in Antoci et al. (2005, 2007, 2008).
14The scenario described by condition (b), where T has higher returns in the
social sector, is less weird than we could think at a ﬁrst glance. Technology has
literally invaded every sphere of our everyday life, included the ﬁeld of social
relationships. A growing part of our human interactions now takes place online,
in the context of virtual networks like Facebook, Twitter, and Flickr, just to
mention a few. For example, Meetic is an ever more popular place to arrange
dates, and the number of engagements between people who met on Meetic-like
platforms is exponentially growing in the last years.
The contexts described in the previous proposition may thus look as “socially
sustainable” development paths, along which technology and social capital ac-
cumulation balance one another in fostering the growth of the private and the
social sectors of the economy.
Overall, if certain conditions hold, technical progress can give rise to scenar-
ios which are very far from the Solaria nightmare described in Asimov’s nov-
els. However, the possibility exists of a progressive reduction of the relational
sphere of individuals, as it happens when conditions (a) and (b) of the above
proposition are not satisﬁed. Asimov’s Solaria is a world characterized by weak
moral norms and the absence of any form of communitarian life, where material
goods play an exaggerated role in determining life-satisfaction. A reader can
enjoy himself in comparing his social environment (from the neighborhood to
the nation-wide level) with Solaria, to imagine to what extent it is subject to
contract the syndrome.
Figures 3a and 3b show, respectively, the time evolution of Ks and of well-
being (measured by the value U(C,B) of the utility function (6)) along the
trajectory starting from the initial conditions Ks(0) = 0.001, T(0) = 1; para-
meter values are: α = 0.3, β = 0.1, γ = 0.52, δ = 0.1, η = 0.21, θ = −0.6195,
λ = 0.5,   = 0.15, π = 0.9, ψ = 0.001. Note that the time evolution of U(C,B)
exhibits an initial growth followed by a decline. At the beginning, technical
progress is able to “compensate” the decline of social capital in the determi-
nation of the utility. However, such a “compensation eﬀect” is jus temporary.
After a certain period of time, T is not able to counterbalance the decrease of
Ks anymore: as a result, the erosion of the stock of social capital is accompained
by a fall in the well-being of individuals.
Figure 3: (a) Time evolution of social capital (b) Time evolution of well-being.
Figure 4 shows an example of path dependence: the stock of social capi-
tal approaches zero along the trajectory starting from Ks(0) = 0.0025,T(0) = 1
15while it grows without bound along the that starting from Ks(0) = 0.0043,T(0) =
1; parameter values are: α = 0.3, β = 0.1, γ = 0.72, δ = 0.1, η = 0.1, θ = −0.81,
λ = 0.5,   = 0.05, π = .2, ψ = 0.1.
Figure 4: An example of path dependence.
7 Concluding remarks
In our paper, we have analyzed the dynamics of an economy constituted by a
continuum of identical agents whose well-being, measured by the CES function
U(C,B) = [λC−θ + (1 − λ)B−θ]− 1
θ, depends on the consumption of a private
good C and of a relational good B. The parameter θ measures the degree
of substitutability between B and C, which are “complements” if θ > 0 and
“substitutes” if θ < 0.
B and C are produced according to the production functions B = sβs1−βKγ
s
and C = (1 −s)Kα
s (t), where s is the time devoted by the representative agent
to social activities, s is the economy-wide average social participation and Ks is
the stock of social capital. In this context, we have analyzed the interplay be-
tween consumption choices and social capital accumulation under the following
alternative assumptions:
1. The time evolution of Ks is given by ˙ Ks = sδKs − ηKs and there is not
technical progress.
2. The time evolution of Ks is given by ˙ Ks = sδKs −ηKs and, furthermore,
is conditioned by exogenous technical progress T, which enters in the pro-
duction functions of C and B: C = (1 − s)Kα
s Tπ and B = sβs1−βKγ
sTψ.
We have shown that, in the context (1), trajectories along which Ks → +∞
exist if and only if the condition θ < 0 holds, i.e. if B and C are substitutes.
In such case, the average social participation s is positively correlated with
Ks: after an increase in social capital, agents will devote more time to social
participation because the social sector has higher returns and B is a “substitute”
16for C. However, in such a context, the variations in the stock of Ks tend to be
self-enforcing: an increase (respectively, a decrease) in Ks leads to an increase
(decrease) in s∗ which in turn gives rise to a further increase (decrease) in Ks.
This mechanism explains the coexistence between growth paths approaching the
poverty trap K
0
s = 0 and growth paths along which Ks grows without bound
(see Figure 1a). The opposite holds in the context θ > 0, where the negative
correlation between s∗ and Ks does not lead the economy neither to approach
K
0
s = 0 nor to follow a path of perpetual growth of Ks (see Figure 1b).
In the scenario (2), trajectories along which Ks → +∞ can exist in both
contextes π−ψ > 0 (i.e. the elasticity of B with respect to T is lower than that
of Y ) and π−ψ < 0. In particular, when π−ψ > 0, such trajectories exist when
B and C are substitutes and technical progress is not “too fast” (condition a.1
of proposition 5) or when B and C are complements and technology grows at
a “high” rate; furthermore, when technical progress grows at a “high” rate, the
complementarity between B and C rules out the risk of contracting the Solaria
Syndrome, that is, of falling in the social poverty trap Ks = 0 (see the last part
of proposition 5); by contrast, the Syndrome remains an actual risk if B and C
are substitutes.
The context π − ψ < 0 is characterized by the fact that both technical
progress and the accumulation of social capital cause a higher productivity
increase in the social sector. Increases in T and Ks cause an unbalanced growth
of the productivity of time spent in social activities. In such a context, if B
and C are complements (θ > 0), then trajectories of unbounded growth of Ks
are not possible. If B and C are substitutes (θ < 0), then, after an increase in
T and Ks, agents will devote more time to social participation because, thanks
to the substitutability they prefer to replace private goods with relational ones.
In this case, substitutability works as a condition for the unbounded growth of
social capital.
Our ﬁndings show that technology plays a key role in the substitution be-
tween material and relational goods, thereby crucially inﬂuencing the evolution
of Ks. Intuition and literary fascinations may lead the reader to think that
technology can possibly harm social interaction. However, we ﬁnd that, in some
cases, technology can work as an antidote to the destruction of human inter-
action feared in the Solaria metaphor. The positive role of technical progress
emerges not only when T improves the relative proﬁtability of social participa-
tion in the scenario where material goods can be replaced by relational ones but
also when the beneﬁts of technical progress mainly concern the private sector.
In this scenario, technology may work as factor of preservation of the social ties
of individuals in a context of growing pressure on time.
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9 Appendix
The time derivative of the variable H is:












































































+  (π − ψ)
 













+  (π − ψ)
 
(18)
20admits at most one stationary state with H > 0. Such stationary state exists
if and only if:
1 >
η(α − γ) −  (π − ψ)
α − γ
> 0















When H → +∞, the right side of (18) tends to:
θ
θ + 1
H [(1 − η)(α − γ) +  (π − ψ)]





H [(1 − η)(α − γ) +  (π − ψ)]
Thus, in order to obtain ˙ H > 0 in the lung run (i.e. for H high enough), the
following condition must hold:
θ
θ + 1
[(1 − η)(α − γ) +  (π − ψ)] > 0
Proposition 4 can be easily proved by taking into account of these features of
dynamics (18).
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